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Discrete Rotational Symmetry and Quantum Key Distribution Protocols
David Shirokoff, Chi-Hang Fred Fung, and Hoi-Kwong Lo
Center for Quantum Information and Quantum Control,
Department of Electrical & Computer Engineering and Department of Physics,
University of Toronto, Toronto, Ontario, Canada
We study the role of discrete rotational symmetry in quantum key distribution by generalizing
the well-known Bennett-Brassard 1984 (BB84) and Scarani-Acin-Ribordy-Gisin 2004 (SARG04)
protocols. We observe that discrete rotational symmetry results in the protocol’s invariance to
continuous rotations, thus leading to a simplified relation between bit and phase error rates and
consequently a straightforward security proof.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Dd, 03.67.-a
I. INTRODUCTION
Unlike classical cryptography which often relies on un-
proven assumptions on computational complexity to en-
sure secrecy, quantum cryptography, or more precisely,
quantum key distribution (QKD), provides proven un-
conditional security against any attacks allowed by quan-
tum mechanics. To date, most of these security proofs
handle protocols on a case by case basis. In particular,
two well-known QKD protocols, the Bennett-Brassard
1984 (BB84) protocol [1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6] and the Scarani-
Acin-Ribordy-Gisin 2004 (SARG04) protocol [7, 8, 9, 10],
have a collection of independent proofs despite sharing
a variety of properties. For example, both schemes are
prepare-and-measure protocols, implying that implemen-
tation does not require a quantum computer but rather
is within the ability of modern optical technology. Both
protocols utilize qubits and use the same four quantum
states to encode information. Thus, the quantum trans-
mission part is the same. They differ only in the classi-
cal discussion part (in particular, the basis reconciliation
step). The two protocols organize the quantum states
into bases in different manners; however, both exhibit
discrete rotational symmetry among the states. The fun-
damental difference between them arises from the fact
that the pairs of basis states in SARG04 are not orthog-
onal as they are in BB84. This non-orthogonality makes
the SARG04 protocol more resilient to multiple-photon
attacks and thus plays a practical role.
In this letter, we wish to generalize the BB84 and
SARG04 protocols to allow an arbitrary number of bases
(M) and arbitrary angle (θ) between basis pairs. Our
motivation is to better understand the role of discrete
symmetry in QKD by studying the relation between these
parameters and the resulting protocol security. The pre-
vious work of Koashi [11] has made strides in the subject.
Nonetheless, we improve on his results in several areas.
Firstly, we derive a closed form formula for the relation-
ship between bit and phase error rates, thus allowing us
to place tighter bounds on the quantum key generation
rate. Secondly, our results hold for any value of θ, while
Koashi requires θ to take on discrete values related toM .
Lastly, rather surprisingly, our closed form expression is
independent of the number of the bases M for M > 2.
Note that our result does not subsume Koashi’s, since he
studied the relations between bit and phase error rates for
an arbitrary number of photons sent out by Alice while
we consider only the single-photon case.
II. THE GENERALIZED PROTOCOL
We now describe the generalized QKD protocol. In
this protocol, Alice prepares qubit states. Experimen-
tally, these may be realized by polarization states. In the
SARG04 protocol, Alice chooses from one of four pairs
of basis states. We generalized the protocol, so that now
she chooses from a set of M ≥ 2 pairs. Hence each of
the M basis pairs has a 1/M chance of being selected.
Moreover, for each of the M basis pairs, the two states
are separated by an angle θ > 0 (see Fig. 1). Thus, when
M = 4, θ = pi/2, the collection of states is identical to
BB84 (here, we adopt a symmetrized version of BB84
with four bases instead of two), while M = 4, θ = pi/4
reduces to the SARG04 protocol. Note that our gen-
eralized protocol does not include the six-state protocol
[12, 13, 14] since the states in our generalized protocol
lie on a plane in the Bloch sphere whereas the six states
in the six-state protocol do not.
In our notation it is convenient to introduce the ro-
tation operator about the y-axis R̂β = e
−ıβbσy , where
σ̂y = ı(|1x〉〈0x| − |0x〉〈1x|). Here, the coefficient of 1 as
opposed to 1/2 in the exponential arises from the fact
that we are considering a spin-±1 qubit, such as a pho-
ton, embedded in a 3D Hilbert space. Thus, the x-basis
kets satisfy: |1x〉 = R̂pi/2|0x〉.
We now denote the set of states that Alice may choose
from by: {|φ+m〉, |φ−m〉} for 0 ≤ m ≤ M − 1. Further-
more, these states take the following representation:
|φ±m〉 = R̂mpi/M
(
cos
θ
2
|0x〉 ± sin θ
2
|1x〉
)
(1)
where |0x〉 and |1x〉 are x-basis eigenkets. Thus, when θ =
pi/2, the states |φ±m〉 become z-basis eigenkets. Also, by
2construction, the set of basis states |φ±m〉 are simply
rotated copies of each other, equally spaced at angular
intervals of pi/M , about the upper half unit circle. Due
to the rigid rotation of the basis states, each pair of states
satisfies the inner product 〈φ+m|φ−m〉 = cos θ, for 0 ≤
m ≤M − 1.
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FIG. 1: The four graphs show the different pairs of qubits
created by Alice (0 ≤ m ≤ 3). We allow for an arbitrary
angle between the basis pairs θ. In the case when M = 4,
θ = pi/2, we recover BB84 (a symmetrized version with four
bases), while θ = pi/4 recovers SARG04. One should note
that when θ = pi/2, the states φ±m become z-eigenstates.
We outline the generalized prepare-and-measure pro-
tocol as follows:
1 Alice prepares n qubits. For each qubit, she randomly
chooses one of the M bases pairs. We denote her
choice of basis by the set of numbers: 0 ≤ li ≤
M − 1, where 1 ≤ i ≤ n. For each qubit, she also
picks a random bit bi.
2 For the ith state, Alice chooses the li basis and pre-
pares either the state |φli〉 if bi = 0 or the state
|φ−li〉 if bi = 1.
3 Alice sends her states over a quantum channel to Bob.
4 Bob receives n possibly noisy qubits. For each state i,
Bob chooses a random number ki representing the
kth basis. For each ki, he then randomly chooses
one of two projection measurements (one projects
onto the orthogonal states {|φki〉, R̂pi/2|φki〉} and
the other onto {|φ−ki〉, R̂pi/2|φ−ki〉}) to measure the
incoming state. When the measurement outcome is
R̂pi/2|φki〉 or R̂pi/2|φ−ki〉, he concludes that the in-
coming state is |φ−ki〉 or |φki〉, respectively. When
either of the other two outcomes occurs, he declares
an inconclusive result for this state.
5 Alice and Bob discuss over classical channels their
preparation and measurement basis. They discard
all i states where li 6= ki. Furthermore, the pair dis-
card all states where Bob records an inconclusive
measurement.
Hence, on average, Alice and Bob retain Ncon ≈ n ·
pcon/M bits, where pcon is the probability of Bob’s mea-
surement is conclusive. When the quantum channel is
perfect (i.e., no Eve), pcon =
1
2
sin2 θ. For some special
cases such as the SARG04 protocol, the reduction by a
factor of M can be avoided (i.e., Ncon ≈ n · pcon). This
is because the two projection measurements for the dif-
ferent ki’s are the same for SARG04. In other words,
there are only two distinct measurements and are inde-
pendent of ki, but the interpretation of the measurement
outcomes is dependent on ki. Additionally, by the same
token, the reduction by a factor of 2 in pcon may not
be needed in some protocols such as the BB84 protocol.
This is because the two projection measurements for each
ki are the same for BB84.
Due to the possibility of a noisy quantum channel or
the presence of Eve, the sequence of Ncon bits shared
by Alice and Bob will not be identical but rather have
some fraction, eb, of errors. Also, Eve may have some
knowledge of the Ncon bits. The remaining steps in the
protocol describe the process of converting the insecure
sequence of Ncon bits into a shorter sequence of R ·Ncon ·
(1− t) secure bits. These steps are analogous to those in
BB84:
6 Alice and Bob discuss and randomly choose a fraction
t of their Ncon bits. They reveal the values of their
bits and estimate the error rate.
7 In a large sampling, their estimated error rate will
asymptotically approach the true error rate eb.
8 Depending on the value of eb, the pair either abort the
protocol or perform error correction and privacy
amplification to distill a secure key of length R ·
Ncon · (1− t).
Without loss of generality and for simplicity, the states
lost in the channel are excluded in the description above
and also in the following derivations. To facilitate the
study, we first convert our prepare-and-measure proto-
col into an equivalent entanglement-distillation-protocol
(EDP)-based QKD protocol (see [5]). By the equivalence
of the two protocol formulations, any results we derive
with one, such as the bound on the secret key generation
rate, apply directly to the other.
To appreciate the connection between EDP and QKD,
we observe that if Alice and Bob shared n pure EPR
states of the form |ψ〉 = 1√
2
(|00〉+ |11〉)z, then individual
measurements in the basis |0z〉, |1z〉 will produce n ran-
dom, identical results. That is, Alice and Bob share an
identical string of random states composed of either |0z〉
or |1z〉. After associating logical values with the states,
3Alice and Bob will share a secure sequence of n random
digits, exactly what is required for a key.
In an EDP, Alice and Bob share n entangled bipar-
tite quantum states. These states, are either mixed or
pure. The task of generating an encryption key there-
fore reduces to the problem of converting the entangled
states into pure EPR pairs by using only local operations
and classical communications (LOCCs). Once the couple
obtains pure EPR pairs, they may simply measure their
states and obtain a secure key as outlined above.
To convert our generalized protocol into an EDP-based
protocol, we must determine a suitable mathematical
representation for the bipartite quantum states, ρAB,
shared by Alice and Bob. We observe that in the prepare-
and-measure scheme, if Alice chooses the lth basis and
randomly prepares either the state |φl〉 or |φ−l〉, then
mathematically her preparation process is identical to
the construction of the joint quantum state |ψl〉AB =
Î ⊗ R̂lpi/M |ψ0〉AB = 1√2 (|0z〉A|φl〉B + |1z〉A|φ−l〉B), fol-
lowed by a z-eigenbasis measurement in the A quantum
subspace. The mathematical representation for ρAB is
outlined as follows. In the subsequent notation we de-
note P
(
|·〉
)
= |·〉〈·|.
Alice’s Preparation : Alice prepares her states by
choosing, with equal probability, among the differ-
ent M bases. Hence in the EDP she will prepare
the ensemble |ψl〉, for 0 ≤ l ≤ M − 1. Thus, for
each l, Alice constructs the state:
ρlAB = P
(
ÎA ⊗ (R̂lpi/M )B|ψ0〉AB
)
. (2)
Noisy Channel : Alice sends the second qubit across
a noisy channel to Bob. To model the noisy chan-
nel we introduce a general quantum operator E ,
which maps density matrices to density matrices.
Such an operator accounts for all possible quan-
tum processes including, unitary evolution in an ex-
tended Hilbert space and generalized POVM mea-
surements made by an eavesdropper. In general,
E(ρ) has a representation by a finite collection of
operators {Êj} such that each ÊjÊ†j is positive,∑
ÊjÊ
†
j = Î, and E(ρ) →
∑
ÊjρÊ
†
j . Thus, the
noisy quantum channel transforms the density ma-
trix according to:
ρlAB → E(ρlAB) (3)
=
∑
j
P
(
ÎA ⊗ (ÊjR̂lpi/M )B|ψ0〉AB
)
.
Bob’s Filtering : Lastly, when Bob receives his quan-
tum states, he randomly chooses one of theM bases
to perform his measurements. For each choice, he
further selects one of two projection measurements
to measure the quantum state. As in Ref. [9], this
measurement process can be modeled by a filtra-
tion operation F̂ , followed by a regular orthogonal
measurement in the z-eigenbasis. Here, the Kraus
filtration operator for the pair of states |φ+0〉 and
|φ−0〉 is: F̂0 = sin(θ/2)|0x〉〈0x| + cos(θ/2)|1x〉〈1x|.
The corresponding filtration operator for a general
pair of states |φ−l〉 and |φ+l〉 is the rotated filter:
F̂l = F̂0R̂−lpi/M . The Kraus filtration operator only
transforms on the right side to ensure the invari-
ance of F̂0|ψ0〉 = F̂l|ψl〉. Since Alice and Bob only
retain states in which they choose the same prepa-
ration and measurement basis, Bob’s operation in
the EDP corresponds to simply F̂l = F̂0R̂−lpi/M .
Hence we have:
ρAB =
1
M
∑
j
M−1∑
l=0
P
(
ÎA⊗(F̂0R̂−lpi/M ÊjR̂lpi/M )B|ψ0〉AB
)
.
(4)
To sum over the M bases in equation (4), we expand
out Êj = Ûj + V̂j , with Ûj = a
j
i σ̂i + a
j
yσ̂y , V̂j = a
j
xσ̂x +
ajzσ̂z and complex coefficients a
j
r for r = i, x, y, z. Here
σ̂r are representations of the identity or Pauli matrices.
Thus, V̂j anti-commutes with σ̂y while Ûj commutes with
both σ̂y and R̂β . It is also simple to prove from first
principles that forM > 1,
∑M−1
l=0 R̂2lpi/M = 0. Therefore
we obtain:
ρAB =
∑
j
[
P
(
(F̂0Ûj)B |ψ0〉AB
)
+
1
M
M−1∑
l=0
P
(
(F̂0V̂jR̂2lpi/M )B|ψ0〉AB
)]
(5)
= F̂0
∑
j
[
Ûj|ψ0〉AB〈ψ0|Û †j + V̂jΦV̂ †j
]
F̂ †0 . (6)
where Φ = 1M
∑M−1
l=0 R̂2lpi/M |ψ0〉AB〈ψ0|R̂−2lpi/M =
1
2
(ÎA ⊗ ÎB + |0〉z〈1| ⊗ R̂−θ + |1〉z〈0| ⊗ R̂θ). Here the
last equality holds only for M > 2 while in the case of
M = 2, Φ = |ψ0〉AB〈ψ0|.
What is the effect of discrete averaging on ρAB?
Firstly, we observe that an arbitrary continuous rota-
tion through an angle β by Alice and Bob transforms
Êj → R̂−βÊjR̂β = Ûj + V̂jR̂2β . Moreover, a close in-
spection shows that forM > 2, Φ commutes with Î⊗R̂β.
Therefore, the process of discrete averaging results in the
invariance of Φ and ρAB to continuous rotations. The ori-
gin of the symmetry derives from the mathematical form
of Φ. By construction Φ commutes with Bob’s discrete
rotations of 2lpi/M and therefore has the same eigenspace
as the discrete rotation operators. For M > 2, dis-
crete and continuous rotations share the same eigenspace.
Therefore Φ must commute with all continuous rotations
[15]. In contrast, whenM = 2, the rotation operators un-
der consideration are proportional to the identity. Hence,
in this case, Φ does not have the same eigenspace as the
continuous rotation group and so the generalM = 2 pro-
4tocol is not invariant under simultaneous rotations by
Alice and Bob.
III. SECURITY ANALYSIS
We now proceed with the security analysis. The quan-
tum bit error rate, eb, is the physical error rate expe-
rienced by Alice and Bob during QKD. Such an error
occurs when Alice prepares a logical 0 or 1, while Bob
conclusively measures 1 or 0. The bit error only gives a
partial indication of the properties of a quantum chan-
nel. One can imagine an eavesdropper or noisy channel
altering the relative phase of a qubit without effecting
bit error rate statistics. Just as eb was introduced as
the error obtained from Alice and Bob’s preparation and
measurement in the z-basis, we may introduce the phase
error as the resulting error rate if the couple prepared
and measured in the x-basis. To study bit and phase
errors, we introduce the Bell basis:
|Φ±〉 = 1√
2
(|00〉 ± |11〉)z, |Ψ±〉 = 1√
2
(|01〉 ± |10〉)z. (7)
The Bell diagonal elements of Alice and Bob’s bipartite
density matrix represent the probabilities of a quantum
channel inducing various errors on their shared entan-
gled state. That is, we may think of Alice and Bob
originally sharing an entangled EPR pair while the ef-
fect of an eavesdropper or noisy channel is to induce
bit errors |0〉z → |1〉z and vice versa, or phase errors
1√
2
(|0z〉± |1z〉)→ 1√
2
(|0z〉∓ |1z〉). Thus, the diagonal el-
ements of the bipartite density matrix have the following
form:
pI = 〈Φ+|ρAB|Φ+〉, px = 〈Ψ+|ρAB|Ψ+〉 (8)
py = 〈Ψ−|ρAB|Ψ−〉, pz = 〈Φ−|ρAB|Φ−〉. (9)
Here, px, pz and py represent the probabilities of a bit
flip, phase flip and both bit and phase flip error. From the
diagonal elements, we may extract closed form expres-
sions for the errors, since eb = px + py and ep = py + pz.
We may insert matrix representations and calculate the
diagonal elements of ρAB explicitly. [As stated earlier,
we always assume that θ > 0.] Interestingly, in the case
when M > 2, Eq. (4) simplifies significantly because of
spherical averaging, resulting in expressions that are in-
dependent of M ; on the other hand, in the case when
M = 2, spherical averaging does not simplify Eq. (4).
A. Case one: M > 2
For the M > 2 case, we have
pi =
1
N ′
∑
j
2|aji |2 sin2 θ (10)
px =
1
N ′
∑
j
sin2 θ(|ajx|2 + |ajz|2) (11)
py =
1
N ′
∑
j
(2|ajy|2 + cos2 θ(|ajx|2 + |ajz|2)) (12)
pz =
1
N ′
∑
j
(|ajx|2 + |ajz|2 + 2 cos2 θ|ajy|2) (13)
where N ′ is a normalization constant (see Appendix A
for detail). Thus, the relation between the bit and phase
error rate is
ep = eb(1 + cos
2 θ), for M > 2. (14)
We remark that this relation as well as the diagonal
elements of the marginal density matrix, Eqs. (10)-(13),
hold independent of the loss in the channel, and also
independent of the number of bases M provided M > 2.
In fact the only important value that still depends on
M is the ratio of conclusively measured bits, Ncon, to
the total signal length n: Ncon/n. Here the ratio scales
as 1/M , since Bob has a 1/M probability of choosing
the same basis for his measurements as the one used by
Alice during preparation. Consequently, there is little
practical advantage for increasing the number of bases in
the generalized 2D protocol.
B. Case two: M = 2
For the M = 2 case, the diagonal elements of ρAB are
pi =
1
N ′′
∑
j
|aji |2 sin2 θ (15)
px =
1
N ′′
∑
j
|ajx|2 sin2 θ (16)
py =
1
N ′′
∑
j
(|ajy|2 + |ajz|2 cos2 θ) (17)
pz =
1
N ′′
∑
j
(|ajz |2 + |ajy|2 cos2 θ), (18)
and the bit and phase error rates are
eb =
1
N ′′
∑
j
(|ajx|2 sin2 θ + |ajy|2 + |ajz|2 cos2 θ) (19)
ep =
1
N ′′
∑
j
(|ajy|2 + |ajz|2)(1 + cos2 θ), (20)
5where N ′′ =
∑
j sin
2 θ(|aji |2+ |ajx|2)+ (1+cos2 θ)(|ajy |2+
|ajz|2). Note that a direct relation between the bit and
phase error rates cannot be readily observed for this case.
In order to obtain this relation, we solve the problem of
maximizing the phase error rate subject to a fixed bit
error rate (see Appendix B for detail). The resulting
relation between bit and phase error rates is as follows:
ep ≤ 1 + cos
2 θ
cos2 θ
eb, for M = 2. (21)
Note that when θ = pi/2, the phase error rate ep goes
to infinity. This is because the two states in the second
basis of the protocol are the same (except for the phases)
as the two states in the first basis (cf. Fig. 1). Thus, the
protocol consists of only two orthogonal states and QKD
cannot be performed.
C. Key generation rate
We may utilize Shor-Preskill’s argument [5] to obtain
the secret key generation rate [16] as (assuming the frac-
tion t of test bits goes to zero)
Rfinal =
pcon
M
[1−H2(eb)−H2(ep)], (22)
where H2(p) = −p log2(p) − (1 − p) log2(1 − p) is the
binary entropy function, eb is the observed bit error rate,
and ep is the inferred phase error rate from Eq. (14) (for
M > 2) or Eq. (21) (for M = 2). For the M > 2 case,
we may increase the key generation rate by incorporating
the mutual information between bit and phase errors. As
in Ref. [10], we may parameterize the diagonal elements
as follows: px = eb − λ, pz = ep − λ, and py = λ. The
overall secret key generation rate is
Rfinal =
pcon
M
[1−H4(1−eb−ep+λ, eb−λ, λ, ep−λ)]. (23)
whereH4(x1, x2, x3, x4) =
∑4
i=1−xi log2 xi. The param-
eter λ represents the mutual information, and in order to
prove security, one needs to find the worst-case value of
λ to compute the worst-case key generation rate. When
one assumes pessimistically that 0 ≤ λ ≤ eb, the worst-
case value can easily be shown to be λ = ebep. In this
case, no mutual information, if any, is incorporated in
the key generation rate in Eq. (23) and it reduces to the
rate in Eq. (22). On the other hand, for the case when
M > 2, we can see from Eqs. (10) to (13) that the ad-
missible range of λ is actually eb cos
2 θ ≤ λ ≤ eb. In
this case, the worst-case value of λ is λ = eb cos
2 θ when
eb < cos
2 θ/(1 + cos2 θ) and is λ = ebep otherwise.
As an example, we consider the SARG04 protocol
(M = 4, θ = pi/4). Using Eq. (14), the relation between
bit and phase error rates is ep = 3eb/2. Assuming that
eb < 1/3, the worst-case value of λ is λ = eb/2. These
results agree with those in Ref. [9, 10].
IV. CONCLUSIONS
In summary, we have proposed and proved the security
of a generalized QKD protocol that includes the BB84
and SARG04 protocols as specific cases. We have de-
rived a closed form formula for the relationship between
the bit and phase error rates of the generalized protocol.
Such a relation allows us to place bounds on the security
of the protocol. Therefore we have provided a unified
security proof for protocols with discrete rotational sym-
metry. We observe that when the number of bases is
larger than two, discrete symmetry simplifies the effect
of a noisy channel or eavesdropper, thus resulting in a
simple relationship between bit and phase error rates. In
this paper, we have only considered Abelian symmetry.
In future, it may be interesting to consider the role of
non-Abelian discrete symmetry in QKD. A similar secu-
rity analysis involving a representation theory summa-
tion (5) may prove useful when studying higher dimen-
sional protocols such as the six-state protocol.
APPENDIX A: CALCULATION OF THE
COMPONENTS OF ρAB WHEN M > 2
In this appendix, we calculate the diagonal elements
of ρAB given in Eq. (4). Specifically, we demonstrate
by example how to derive Eqs. (10)-(13) by explicitly
deriving Eq. (11). The other equations can be obtained
in a similar way. To proceed, we first prove the following
lemma.
Lemma 1. The following are spherical averages forM >
2:
1
M
M−1∑
l=0
cos2 2lpi/M = 1/2 (A1)
1
M
M−1∑
l=0
sin2 2lpi/M = 1/2 (A2)
1
M
M−1∑
l=0
cos 2lpi/M sin 2lpi/M = 0 (A3)
Proof. The trigonometric functions decompose into ex-
ponentials as:
cos2 2lpi/M =
1
4
(2 + e4lpi/M + e−4lpi/M ) (A4)
sin2 2lpi/M =
1
4
(2 + ie4lpi/M − ie−4lpi/M )(A5)
cos 2lpi/M sin 2lpi/M = −1
2
i(e4lpi/M − e−4lpi/M ) (A6)
In addition, we have the geometric series
1
M
M−1∑
l=0
e±4lpi/M =
1− e±4pi
1− e±4pi/M (A7)
= 0 (A8)
6which follows directly for M 6= 2 since the denomi-
nator is finite. Thus, substitution of the former (A4)
into the latter (A7) yields the desired result. In the
special case where M = 2, equation (A7) is ill de-
fined. Instead, we have by inspection summations of
the form: 1
4
∑3
l=0 cos
2 lpi/2 = (1 + 1)/4 = 1/2 and
1
4
∑3
l=0 sin
2 lpi/2 = 1/2, as required.
1. Calculation of px
We first take the inner product of ρAB given in Eq. (4)
with the Bell state corresponding to a bit flip error:
px = 〈Ψ+|ρAB|Ψ+〉 (A9)
=
1
M
∑
j
M−1∑
l=0
∣∣∣〈Ψ+|ÎA ⊗
(F̂0R̂−lpi/M ÊjR̂lpi/M )B|ψ0〉AB
∣∣∣2 (A10)
Temporarily dropping the summation over channel op-
erators Êj and inserting the x-basis representations for
|Ψ+〉 and |ψ〉AB we obtain:
=
1
M
M−1∑
l=0
∣∣∣ 1√
2
(〈00| − 〈11|)(F̂0R̂−lpi/M ÊjR̂lpi/M )B ×
(cos
θ
2
|00〉B + sin θ
2
|11〉)
∣∣∣2 (A11)
=
sin2 θ
4M
M−1∑
l=0
|〈0|R̂−lpi/M ÊjR̂lpi/M |0〉 −
〈1|R̂−lpi/M ÊjR̂lpi/M |1〉|2 (A12)
Lastly, we insert our matrix representations for the op-
erators R̂lpi/M and Êj :
=
sin2 θ
4M
M−1∑
l=0
∣∣∣ax cos 2lpi/M − az sin 2lpi/M ∣∣∣2 (A13)
=
sin2 θ
4M
M−1∑
l=0
(
|ax|2 cos2 2lpi/M + |az|2 sin2 2lpi/M −
(axa
∗
z + aza
∗
x) cos 2lpi/M sin 2lpi/M
)
(A14)
which, by our preliminary lemma, reduces to:
px =
1
8
sin2 θ(|ax|2 + |az|2). (A15)
By reintroducing the summation over j for the chan-
nel operators Êj and normalizing, we obtain Eq. (11).
The normalization constant in Eq. (11) is N ′ =
2
∑
j |aji |2 sin2 θ + |ajx|2 + (1 + cos2 θ)|ajy |2 + |ajz|2. The
expressions for pi, py, and pz can also be obtained in a
similar way.
APPENDIX B: RELATION BETWEEN BIT AND
PHASE ERROR RATES WHEN M = 2
In this appendix, we find the relation between the bit
and phase error rates for the M = 2 case by solving
the problem of maximizing the phase error rate given in
Eq. (20) subject to a fixed bit error rate given in Eq. (19).
This problem can be written as follows:
maximize
ep = (|ay |2 + |az |2)(1 + cos2 θ) (B1)
subject to
eb = |ax|2 sin2 θ + |ay|2 + |az|2 cos2 θ (B2)
1 = (|ai|2 + |ax|2) sin2 θ +
(|ay |2 + |az |2)(1 + cos2 θ) (B3)
|ai|2, |ax|2, |ay|2, |az|2 ≥ 0 (B4)
where the maximization is over |aβ|2 , 1N ′′
∑
j |ajβ |2, β ∈
{i, x, y, z}. Here, the second constraint in Eq. (B3) is
due the normalization requirement that pi + px + py +
pz = 1. Since there are two equality constraints and four
optimization variables, we may eliminate two variables,
namely |ay|2 and |az |2, and simplify the problem to
maximize
ep = 1− (|ai|2 + |ax|2) sin2 θ (B5)
subject to
1
sin2 θ
[
eb −A
−eb +B
]
+
[
A −B
−B A
] [ |ai|2
|ax|2
]
≥ 0 (B6)
|ai|2, |ax|2 ≥ 0 (B7)
where B = 1/(1 + cos2 θ) and A = B cos2 θ. Here, the
objective function in Eq. (B5) is obtained by substituting
Eq. (B3) in Eq. (B1); the left-hand side of Eq. (B6) is
obtained by solving Eqs. (B2) and (B3) for [|ay|2; |az|2],
which are both greater than zero according to Eq. (B4),
thus leading to the inequality in Eq. (B6). Note that
in general |ai|2 = |ax|2 = 0 (giving arise to ep = 1)
may not be a feasible solution. The simplified problem
is a linear programming problem; the four constraints
in the problem correspond to four lines and the objective
function corresponds to a line in a two-dimensional space.
Suppose that we are interested in the case when eb ≤ A
(which turns out to cover the entire range of ep, 0 ≤ ep ≤
1). Given that eb ≤ A, one can easily find the feasible
region and the maximizing point (|ai|2, |ax|2). It turns
out that the maximizing point is
(|ai|2, |ax|2) =
(
A− eb
A sin2 θ
, 0
)
, (B8)
and the maximum phase error rate is
ep =
1 + cos2 θ
cos2 θ
eb, for M = 2 and eb ≤ cos
2 θ
1 + cos2 θ
.
(B9)
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